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Abstract
We study properties related to relevance in non-monotonic consequence relations obtained by systems
of structured argumentation. Relevance desiderata concern the robustness of a consequence relation
under the addition of irrelevant information. For an account of what (ir)relevance amounts to we use
syntactic and semantic considerations. Syntactic criteria have been proposed in the domain of relevance
logic and were recently used in argumentation theory under the names of non-interference and crash-
resistance. The basic idea is that the conclusions of a given argumentative theory should be robust under
adding information that shares no propositional variables with the original database. Some semantic
relevance criteria are known from non-monotonic logic. For instance, cautious monotony states that if
we obtain certain conclusions from an argumentation theory, we may expect to still obtain the same
conclusions if we add some of them to the given database. In this paper we investigate properties of
structured argumentation systems that warrant relevance desiderata.
1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate conditions under which the non-monotonic consequence relation of a given
structured argumentation system is robust when irrelevant information is added or removed. Relevance can
hereby be understood in two ways. First, syntactically as information that shares propositional variables
with the information at hand. Second, semantically, as information that for some reason should not be
considered to have defeating power over previously accepted arguments.
Structured argumentation has been studied in various settings such as ASPIC [19, 20], ABA [7, 21],
and logic-based argumentation [2, 5, 6]. These frameworks share the underlying idea that arguments are to
have a logical structure and attacks between them are at least partially determined by logical considerations.
Although investigations into translations between these frameworks have been intensified recently [14], the
frameworks are in various aspects difficult to compare and results obtained in one do not easily transfer
to others. For this reason, we decided in this paper to study relevance-related properties for structured
argumentation on the basis of a simple framework for structured argumentation that allows us, on the
one hand, to abstract away from particularities of the systems from the literature and, on the other hand,
to translate these frameworks easily. The framework is simple in that arguments are premise-conclusion
pairs (Γ, γ) obtained from a given consequence relation and it only allows for one type of attack (attacks
in premises). The obtained simplicity makes studying meta-theory technically straight-forward and the
availability of the translations makes results easily transferable.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our general setting for structured argu-
mentation. In Section 3 we define the basic relevance-related properties that we will investigate in this
paper. In Section 4 we show how many of the most common systems of structured argumentation can be
represented in our setting. In Section 5 we prove our main results. We conclude in Section 6.
2 General Setting
In the following we work with a simple setting for structured argumentation. It is abstract in the sense that
it allows for instantiations that are adequate representations of many of the available systems of structured
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argumentation such as logic-based argumentation, ASPIC, ABA, etc. (see Sec. 4). In this contribution we
restrict ourselves to non-prioritized settings.
We suppose to have available a formal language L (we denote the set of well-formed formulas over L
also by L) and a relation ⊢ ⊆ ℘fin(L)×L (where ℘fin denotes the set of finite subsets) which we will refer
to as the deducability relation. We do not suppose any of the usual Tarskian properties in what follows
(reflexivity, transitivity, and monotonicity).
Definition 1 (Arg⊢(·)). Given a set of formulas S ⊆ L we denote by Arg⊢(S) the set of S-based ar-
guments: (Γ, γ) ∈ Arg⊢(S) iff Γ ⊢ γ for Γ ⊆ S. Given a = (Γ, γ) ∈ Arg⊢(S), Conc(a) = γ and
Supp(a) = Γ.
To accommodate argumentative attacks we suppose to have two functions: a contrariness function
· : L → ℘(L) that associates each formulawith a set of conflicting formulas and a function ·̂ : ℘fin(L)\∅ →
℘fin(L) that associates support sets with sets of formulas in which they can be attacked.
Remark 1. Often ·̂ will simply be the identity function, although another option is, e.g., Γ̂ = {
∧
Γ′ | ∅ 6=
Γ′ ⊆ Γ}.
Definition 2 (AF⊢). An (argumentation) setting is a triple AF⊢ = (⊢, ·, ·̂). A setting based on S ⊆ L is
given by the quadrupleAF⊢(S) = (S,⊢, ·, ·̂).
Example 1. A simple example of a setting is AFpdef⊢CL = (⊢CL, ·, id) where ⊢CL is the deducability relation
of classical propositional logic and φ = {¬φ}.
Example 2. Another example is the setting AFdef⊢CL = (⊢CL, ·, ·̂) where φ = {¬φ} and Γ̂ = {
∧
∆ | ∅ 6=
∆ ⊆ Γ}.
Definition 3 (Attacks). Given a setting AF⊢(S), where a = (Γ, γ) ∈ Arg⊢(S) and b = (Γ
′, γ′) ∈
Arg⊢(S), a attacks b (in φ) iff there is a φ ∈ Γ̂
′ for which γ ∈ φ.
Our attack form is sometimes called premise-attack [20] or directed undercut [6]. In Section 4 we will
show that by adjusting · and ·̂ adequately we are able to accommodate many other attack forms defined in
the literature.
Definition 4 (Attack Diagram). Given a setting AF⊢(S), its attack diagram is the directed graph with the
set of nodes Arg⊢(S) and edges between a and b iff a attacks b.
Definition 5 (Dung Semantics, [12]). Where AF⊢(S) is a setting and A ⊆ Arg⊢(S) we define: A is
conflict-free iff there are no a, b ∈ A such that a attacks b. A defends a ∈ Arg⊢(S) iff for each attacker
b ∈ Arg⊢(S) of a there is a c ∈ A that attacks b. A is admissible iff it is conflict-free and it defends every
a ∈ A. A is complete iff it is admissible and it contains every a ∈ Arg⊢(S) it defends. A is preferred iff
it is ⊆-maximal complete. A is grounded iff it is ⊆-minimal complete. A is stable iff it is admissible and
for all a ∈ Arg⊢(S) \ A there is a b ∈ A that attacks a.
We denote the set of all admissible [complete, preferred, stable] sets A (also called “extensions”) by
Adm(AF⊢(S)) [Cmp(AF⊢(S)),Prf(AF⊢(S)), Stb(AF⊢(S))] and the grounded set by Grd(AF⊢(S)).
Definition 6 (Consequence Relations). Where Sem ∈ {Grd,Prf, Stb}, and given a settingAF⊢ we define:
S |∼AF⊢Sem φ iff for all A ∈ Sem(AF⊢(S)) there is an a ∈ A with Conc(a) = φ.
Where the setting AF⊢ is clear from the context we will simply write |∼Sem to avoid clutter.
Remark 2. For reasons of space we restrict our focus in this paper on skeptical consequence as defined in
Definition 6. Note that |∼AF⊢Cmp coincides with |∼
AF⊢
Grd .
3 The Relevance Properties
3.1 Syntactic Relevance
A syntactical relevance property that has been proposed in the context of structured argumentation is non-
interference [9]. Let us call two sets of formulas syntactically disjoint if no atom that occurs in a formula
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in S1 also occurs in a formula in S2 and vice versa: so Atoms(S1) ∩ Atoms(S2) = ∅ where Atoms(S) is
the set of atoms occurring in formulas in S. In such cases we write: S1 | S2.
Definition 7 (Non-Interference, [9]). |∼ ⊆ ℘(L)×L satisfies Non-Interference iff for all S1∪{φ}∪S2 ⊆ L
for which (S1 ∪ {φ}) | S2 we have:
1 S1 |∼φ iff S1 ∪ S2 |∼φ.
Definition 8 (Contamination, [9]). Let |∼ ⊆ ℘(L) × L be a consequence relation. A set S ⊆ L, such that
Atoms(S) ⊂ Atoms(L), is called contaminating (with respect to |∼), if for any set of formulas S ′ ⊆ L
such that S | S ′ and for every φ ∈ L, it holds that S |∼ φ if and only if S ∪ S ′ |∼ φ.
Consequence relations that are non-trivial and satisfy Non-Interference also satisfy Crash-Resistance:2
Definition 9 (Crash-Resistance, [9]). A consequence relation |∼ ⊆ ℘(L) × L satisfies Crash-Resistance
iff there is no set S ⊆ L that is contaminating with respect to |∼.
Given a setting AF⊢, a natural question is whether Non-Interference is a property that gets inherited
on the level of non-monotonic inference |∼Sem from ⊢: we will show below that in case ⊢ satisfies Non-
Interference so does |∼Sem. In fact, the following less requiring criterion is sufficient:
Definition 10 (Pre-Relevance). ⊢ ⊆ ℘(L) × L satisfies Pre-Relevance iff for all S1 ∪ {φ} ∪ S2 ⊆ L for
which S1 ∪ {φ} | S2: if S1 ∪ S2 ⊢ φ then there is a S ′1 ⊆ S1 such that S
′
1 ⊢ φ.
When considering attacks we need to extend the notion of Pre-Relevance by taking into account ·̂ and
·. We first define:
Definition 11 (Prime settings). A setting (⊢, ·, ·̂) is prime iff for all sets of atoms A1 and A2 in L
for which A1 | A2, for all S1, T1,S2, T2 ∈ ℘fin(L) for which Atoms(S1),Atoms(T1) ⊆ A1 and
Atoms(S2),Atoms(T2) ⊆ A2, and for all φ and ψ for which ψ ∈ φ and φ ∈ T̂1 ∪ T2, we have:
if S1 ∪ S2 ⊢ ψ then there are i ∈ {1, 2}, S ′i ⊆ Si, φi ∈ T̂i and ψi ∈ φi for which S
′
i ⊢ ψi.
Definition 12 (Pre-Relevant Settings). A setting AF = (⊢,·, ·̂) is Pre-Relevant iff (i) ⊢ is Pre-Relevant,
(ii) AF is prime, and (iii) ·̂ is ⊆-monotonic (i.e., for all∆,∆′ ∈ ℘fin(L), ∆̂ ⊆ ∆̂ ∪∆′).
Example 3. Note that ·̂ : ∆ 7→ ∆ (see Ex. 1) and ·̂ : ∆ 7→ {
∧
∆′ | ∅ ⊂ ∆′ ⊆ ∆} (see Ex. 2) are both
⊆-monotonic.
Fact 1. Where ·̂ = id(·) (see Ex. 1) and γ = {¬γ}, the Pre-Relevance of (⊢, ·, ·̂) follows from the Pre-
Relevance of ⊢.
Proof. Items (i) and (iii) are trivial. For Item (ii) suppose that S1 ∪ S2 ⊢ ψ, where ψ = ¬φ and φ ∈
T̂1 ∪ T2 = T1∪T2 and where S1,S2, T1, T2 are as in Def. 11. Thus, there is an i ∈ {1, 2} s.t. φ ∈ Ti. Thus,
Atoms(ψ) ⊆ Ai. By the Pre-Relevance of ⊢, there is an S ′i ⊆ Si for which S
′
i ⊢ ψ.
Fact 2. Where ∆̂ = {
∧
∆′ | ∅ ⊂ ∆′ ⊆ ∆} (see Ex. 2), γ = {¬γ} and ⊢ is contrapositable (i.e.,
S ⊢ ¬
∧
(∆ ∪∆′) implies S ∪∆′ ⊢ ¬
∧
∆), the Pre-Relevance of (⊢, ·, ·̂) follows from the Pre-Relevance
of ⊢.
In Section 5.1 we will show that:
Theorem 1. If AF⊢ satisfies Pre-Relevance then |∼
AF⊢
Sem satisfies Non-Interference for each Sem ∈
{Grd,Prf}.
Example 4. We take the settingAF⊢RM = (⊢RM, ·, id), where ⊢RM is the consequence relation of the semi-
relevance logic RM and · : φ 7→ {¬φ}. ⊢RM satisfies Pre-Relevance (see [4, Prop. 6.5]) and thus AF⊢RM
satisfies Non-Inference and Crash-Resistance. Similar for other relevance logics.
1A similar property is Basic Relevance [3, Definition 3.1].
2|∼ is non-trivial if there are always two sets of formulas with the same atoms but different conclusions (see [9]).
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Example 5. Although ⊢CL does not satisfy Pre-Relevance, ⊢⊤CL does, where ⊢
⊤
CL is the restriction of ⊢CL
to pairs (Γ, γ) for which 0CL ¬
∧
Γ. Hence, AF⊢⊤
CL
=
(
⊢⊤CL, ·, id
)
where · : φ 7→ {¬φ} satisfies Non-
Interference. In [22] such a restriction is applied in the context of ASPIC.
Example 6. Recently paraconsistent logics based on maximal consistent subsets [13] have been used in the
context of structured argumentation. Let Γ ⊢∩mcs φ [Γ ⊢
∪
mcs φ] iff for all [some] maximal consistent subsets
Γ′ of Γ, Γ′ ⊢CL φ. (Γ
′ ⊆ Γ is a maximal consistent subset of Γ if it is consistent and there are no consistent
Γ′′ ⊆ Γ such that Γ′ ⊂ Γ′′.) Such consequence relations satisfy Pre-Relevance and thus, argumentative
settings based on them satisfy Non-Interference.
A refinement of Theorem 1 is given in Corollary 1 below.
Definition 13. Given a setting (⊢, ·, ·̂) let ⊢∅ be the restriction of ⊢ to pairs (Γ, γ) for which there is no
(∅, δ) ∈ ⊢ such that δ ∈ ψ for some ψ ∈ Γ̂.
Since arguments with empty supports have no attackers we have:
Lemma 1. Where Sem ∈ {Grd,Prf} and S ⊆ L,
S |∼
(⊢,·,̂·)
Sem φ iff S |∼
(⊢∅,·,̂·)
Sem φ.
Corollary 1. If AF⊢∅ satisfies Pre-Relevance then |∼
AF⊢
Sem satisfies Non-Interference for each Sem ∈
{Grd,Prf}.
We illustrate the latter point with an example.
Example 7. Also the setting AFdef⊢CL in Ex. 2 satisfies Non-Interference. Note for this that ⊢
∅
CL = ⊢
⊤
CL
(where the latter is defined as in Ex. 5) in the context of AFdef⊢CL .
In the following sections we will relate these results to systems of structured argumentation from the
literature.
3.2 Semantic Relevance
As for semantic relevance we study in this paper a criterion known from non-monotonic logic, namely
Cumulativity.
Definition 14. Given ⊢ ⊆ ℘(L)×L and φ ∈ L, let ⊢+φ be the transitive closure of ⊢ ∪ {(∅, φ)}. Given a
settingAF⊢ and a semantics Sem ∈ {Grd,Prf, Sem} let |∼
+φ
Sem be an abbreviation of |∼
AF
⊢+φ
Sem andAF
+φ
⊢
for AF⊢+φ .
On the level of consequence relations Cumulativity is the following property, intuitively expressing that
the consequence set is invariant under the addition of derivable formulas to the premises:
Definition 15 (Cumulativity). A setting AF⊢ satisfies Cumulativity for Sem ∈ {Grd,Prf, Stb}, iff, for all
S ∪ {φ, ψ} ⊆ L such that S |∼Sem φ we have: S |∼
+φ
Sem ψ iff S |∼Sem ψ.
On the level of Dung-extensions, Cumulativity is:
Definition 16 (Extensional Cumulativity). A setting AF⊢ satisfies Extensional Cumulativity for Sem ∈
{Grd,Prf, Stb} if and only if for all S ∪ {φ} ⊆ L such that S |∼Sem φ we have that: Sem(AF⊢(S)) =
{E ∩ Arg⊢(S) | E ∈ Sem(AF⊢+φ(S))} .
We will show, in Section 5.2, that a settingAF⊢ satisfies Cumulativity for grounded semantics ifAF⊢
is pointed:
Definition 17 (Pointed Settings). (⊢, ·, ·̂) is pointed iff
1. for all Γ,∆ ∈ ℘fin(L), Γ̂ ∪∆ = Γ̂ ∪ ∆̂ (in this case we say that ·̂ is pointed), and
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2. ⊢ satisfies Cut w.r.t. ⊢+φ for any φ ∈ L, i.e., for every Γ ∪ {γ} ⊆ L, Γ ∪ ∆ ⊢ γ if Γ ⊢ φ and
∆ ⊢+φ γ.
Theorem 2. Where AF⊢ is pointed, AF⊢ satisfies Cumulativity and Extensional Cumulativity for
grounded semantics.
Example 8. Any setting (⊢, ·, id) is pointed iff ⊢ satisfies Cut. For instance, each of the consequence
relations in Examples 1 and 4 satisfies Cut and thus the corresponding settings are pointed and therefore
satisfy Cumulativity.
If we restrict ⊢ to consistent sets on the left side, denoted by ⊢con (see Def. 19 below) and if ⊢ satisfies
Cut and Contraposition (see Def. 18 below), then the setting AF con = (⊢con, ·, id) is cumulative. In more
detail:
Definition 18. (⊢, ·) is contrapositable iff for all Θ ∈ ℘fin(L), if Θ ⊢ γ′ where γ′ ∈ γ then for all σ ∈ Θ,
(Θ ∪ {γ}) \ {σ} ⊢ σ′ for some σ′ ∈ σ. By extension we call AF⊢ = 〈⊢, ·, ·̂〉 contrapositable if (⊢, ·) is
contrapositable.
Definition 19. Where AF⊢ = 〈⊢, ·, id〉, a set Θ ⊆ S is AF⊢(S)-inconsistent iff there is a Θ′ ⊆ Θ and a
γ ∈ Θ′ for which Θ \ {γ} ⊢ γ′ where γ′ ∈ γ. Θ is AF⊢(S)-consistent iff it is not AF⊢(S)-inconsistent.
Given ⊢, let ⊢con= {(Γ, γ) | Γ ⊢ γ and Γ is AF⊢-consistent}.
Theorem 3. Where AF⊢ = (⊢, ·, id) is contrapositable and ⊢ satisfies Cut, AF con = (⊢con, ·, id) is
cumulative and extensionally cumulative for Sem ∈ {Grd,Prf, Stb}.
Example 9. In view of Theorem 3, AF⊢⊤
CL
from Ex. 5 is cumulative for Sem ∈ {Grd, Stb,Prf}.
4 Systems of Structured Argumentation
In this section we take a look at several of the structured argumentation frameworks from the literature and
show how they can be represented in our setting.
Example 10 (Logic-Based Argumentation). Logic-based argumentation is closest to our setting from Sec-
tion 2. Systems can be found in, for instance, [2, 5].3 The core logic L is a finitary Tarskian logic with
an adequate consequence relation ⊢ ⊆ ℘fin(L) × L. Given a set S ⊆ L, the set of arguments defined by
Arg⊢(S) consists of all (Γ, γ) where Γ ⊢ γ and Γ ⊆ S just like in Def. 1. Different attack rules have been
proposed, such as: (Γ, γ) attacks (∆, ψ) iff . . .
Defeat (Def): γ ⊢ ¬
∧
∆′ for some ∅ 6= ∆′ ⊆ ∆.
Undercut (Ucut): ⊢ γ ≡ ¬
∧
∆′ for some ∅ 6= ∆′ ⊆ ∆.
Direct Compact Defeat (DiCoDef): γ = ¬δ′ for some δ′ ∈ ∆.
Direct Undercut (DiUcut): there is a δ ∈ ∆ s.t. ⊢ γ ≡ ¬δ.
Direct Defeat (DiDef): there is a δ ∈ ∆ s.t. γ ⊢ ¬δ.
Dung semantics are defined as usual on top of an attack diagram analogous to Definitions 4 and 5.
Consequence relations are defined analogous to Definition 6 S ‖∼Sem φ iff in all Sem-extensions there is
an argument (Γ, φ).
Systems of logic-based argumentation translate rather directly to our setting. We only need to adjust
the definitions of · and ·̂ so that we can use our attack definition to simulate the attack definitions above.
The following table shows how:
3There are differences between these presentations: while [5, 6] use classical logic as a core logic, [2] allows for any Tarskian logic
with an adequate sequent calculus to serve as core logic. [5, 6] require the support sets of arguments to be consistent and minimal
while [2] omit this requirement. In what follows we follow the generalized setting of [2]. Consistency and minimality can easily be
captured by changing the underlying relation ⊢ (see e.g., Ex. 5).
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δ ∆̂
DiCoDef {¬δ} ∆
Def {¬δ} {
∧
∆′ | ∅ ⊂ ∆′ ⊆ ∆}
DiDef {γ | γ ⊢ ¬δ} ∆
DiUcut {γ | γ ⊢ ¬δ,¬δ ⊢ γ} ∆
Ucut {γ | γ ⊢ ¬δ,¬δ ⊢ γ} {
∧
∆′ | ∅ ⊂ ∆′ ⊆ ∆}
The easy proof concerning the adequacy of our representations is omitted for reasons of space.
Remark 3. The definitions for direct attack forms (DiDef, DiUcut, DiCoDef) all give rise to a pointed ·̂
(namely id) in our representation. Thus, combining these attack forms with core logics L for which ⊢L
satisfies Cut, we obtain Cumulativity.
Remark 4. Instantiating logic-based argumentation with a core logic that satisfies Pre-Relevance (such as
the ones in Examples 4, 5, 6) we obtain Non-Interference.
Example 11 (Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA), [7]). Let L be a formal language, · : L → ℘(L)
a contrariness function, Ab ⊆ L a subset of so-called assumptions, and R be a set of rules of the form
φ1, . . . , φn → φ where φ1, . . . , φn, φ ∈ L and φ /∈ Ab.4 There is an R-deduction from some ∆ ⊆ Ab to
φ iff there is a sequence φ1, . . . , φn for which ∆ = {φ1, . . . , φn} ∩ Ab, φn = φ and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
φi is either in∆ or there is a rule φi1 , . . . , φim → φi where i1, . . . , im < i. Given two sets of assumptions
∆,∆′ ⊆ Ab,∆ attacks∆′ iff there is a δ ∈ ∆′ for which there is anR-deduction of someψ ∈ δ from some
∆′′ ⊆ ∆. Subsets of assumptions in Ab and attacks between them give rise to an attack diagram where
nodes are sets of assumptions and arcs are attacks. Dung-style semantics are applied to these graphs: ∆
is conflict-free if it does not attack itself, ∆ is admissible if it defends itself, it is complete if it contains
all assumptions it defends, it is preferred if it is maximally admissible and stable if it is admissible and
attacks every assumption it does not contain. Given a semantics Sem, a consequence relation is given by
(Ab,R) ‖∼abaSem φ iff φ isR-derivable from all sets of assumptions∆ ⊆ Ab that satisfy the requirements of
Sem.
In most presentations of ABA, the rules R are considered domain-specific strict inference rules that
are part of a given knowledge base. They may also be obtained from an underlying core logic L with
consequence relation ⊢L by setting φ1, . . . , φn → φ iff {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊢L φ.
We can translate ABA into our setting as follows. Where R represents domain-specific rules that are
part of the knowledge base, we define for∆ ⊆ Ab andR′ ⊆ R:
(†aba) ∆ ∪ R′ ⊢ φ, iff, there is an R-deduction of φ from ∆ making use of the rules in R′ (and only of
these).5
WhereR is generated from a given core logic L, we define for∆ ⊆ Ab:
(‡aba) ∆ ⊢ φ, iff,∆ ⊢L φ.
In both cases, we use the definition of · from ABA, let ·̂ = id(·). Clearly, in our setting (∆, δ) attacks
(Γ, γ) iff δ ∈ φ for some φ ∈ Γ. For reasons of space we omit the proof that the setting AF⊢(Ab ∪ R)
[resp. AF⊢(Ab)] adequately represents the ABA framework based on Ab and R for ⊢ in (†aba) [resp.
(‡aba)] so that (Ab,R) ‖∼
aba
Sem φ iff Ab ∪R |∼
AF⊢
Sem φ [resp. Ab |∼
AF⊢
Sem φ].
Remark 5. It is easy to see that for representation (†aba) the underlying consequence relation ⊢ satisfies
Pre-Relevance and if (†) Atoms(φ) ⊆ Atoms(φ) for all φ ∈ L, we obtain Non-Interference. For the
representation (‡aba) it depends on the logic L. In case ⊢L satisfies Pre-Relevance and if (†) we obtain
Non-Interference.
Remark 6. Our representation of ABA makes use of the pointed ·̂ (namely id) and R-derivability satisfies
Cut. Note that AF⊢+φ(Ab ∪R) [resp. AF⊢+φ(Ab)] adequately represents the ABA framework based on
(Ab,R∪ {→ φ}) for ⊢ in (†aba) [resp. for ⊢ in (‡aba)]. Thus we obtain Cumulativity.
4In this paper we restrict ourselves to so-called flat frameworks that satisfy the latter requirement.
5For this the language L underlying the original ABA framework is enriched byR so that ⊢ ⊆ ℘fin(L∪R)×L. This is important
to track syntactic relevance.
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Example 12 (ASPIC, [19, 20]). In ASPIC we work with a formal language L, a contrariness function
· : L → ℘(L), a set of defeasible rules D and a set of strict rules R of the form A1, . . . , An ⇒ A
resp. A1, . . . , An → A. Similarly as was the case for ABA, the strict rules may reflect domain-specific
knowledge or be generated in view of an underlying core logic L. We assume that L contains for each
defeasible rule R ∈ D a logical atom n(R) that serves as name of R. An (D,R)-deduction of φ ∈ L from
∆ ⊆ L is given by a tree
• whose leaves are labeled by elements in∆ (so that each δ ∈ ∆ occurs as label of a leaf),
• for every non-root node labeled byψ there is a ruleR = φ1, . . . , φn → ψ ∈ R orR = φ1, . . . , φn ⇒
ψ ∈ D and its child-nodes are labeled by φ1, . . . , φn (if R has an empty body, the single child-node
is unlabeled). The edges connecting the child-nodes with the parent are labeled R.6
• the root of the tree is labeled by φ.
Given a (D,R)-derivation a, DefC(a) [StrC(a)] is the set of all node labels to which an edge labeled
with a defeasible [strict] rule leads and DefR(a) [StrR(a)] is the set of all edge labels that are defeasible
[strict] rules.
An argumentation theory is a triple (P ,R,D) where P ⊆ L is a set of premises, R is a set of strict
rules and D is a set of defeasible rules. The set Argaspic(P ,R,D) is the set of all (D,R)-derivations of
some φ ∈ L from some finite ∆ ⊆ P . Given two arguments a, b ∈ Argaspic(P ,R,D), a rebuts b iff there
is a φ ∈ DefC(b) such that Conc(a) ∈ φ; a undercuts b iff a ∈ n(R) for some R ∈ DefR(b). Attack
diagrams, underlying Dung-semantics and consequence relations ‖∼aspicSem are then defined in the usual way.
To represent ASPIC in our setting we first need to define our derivability relation and then translate the
ASPIC attacks. In case the set of strict rulesR presents domain-specific knowledge we define:
(†aspic) Γ ⊢ φ iff there is a (D,R)-derivation a of φ from P where Γ = {R, n(R) | R ∈ DefR(a)} ∪
DefC(a) ∪ StrR(a) ∪ {→ ψ | ψ ∈ P}.7
IfR is generated via an underlying core logic we define:
(‡aspic) Γ ⊢ φ iff there is a (D,R)-derivation a of φ from P where Γ = {R, n(R) | R ∈ DefR(a)} ∪
DefC(a) ∪ {→ ψ | ψ ∈ P}.
For reasons of space we omit the proof that, where S = {R, n(R),Conc(R) | R ∈ D} ∪ {→ ψ | ψ ∈
P} and ·̂ = id(·),8 the setting AF⊢(S ∪R) [resp.AF⊢(S)] represents the ASPIC theory (P ,R,D) for ⊢
in (†aspic) [resp. in (‡aspic)] so that (P ,R,D) ‖∼
aspic
Sem φ iff S ∪ R |∼
AF⊢
Sem φ [resp. S |∼
AF⊢
Sem φ].
Remark 7. Analogous to Remark 5, if (†) holds, we obtain Non-Interference for the presentation (†aspic)
and for (‡aspic) if additionally the underlying logic L satisfies Pre-Relevance.
Remark 8. Our representation of ASPIC makes use of the pointed ·̂ (namely id) and (D,R)-derivability
satisfies Cut. Note thatAF⊢+φ(S∪R) [resp.AF⊢+φ(S)] adequately represents the ASPIC argumentation
theory (P ∪ {φ},R,D) for ⊢ in (†aspic) [resp. for ⊢ in (‡aspic)] and S as specified in Example 12. Thus we
obtain Cumulativity for grounded semantics.
5 Meta-Theory
We will now present the proofs of Theorems 1, 2 and 3.
6Usually edges are not labeled with rules in ASPIC (and so in cases of rules with empty bodies, there are usually no child-nodes
either). We introduce these labels since they enable us to define our representation in a simpler way. We also simplify the presentation
in that we do not assume there to be defeasible premises.
7Similar as in the case of ABA we enrich the language L for ⊢ to track syntactic relevance. See Fn. 5.
8For the variants ASPIC− [10] and ASPIC⊖ [15] where rebut is unrestricted we need to add StrC(a) to Γ in (†aspic) and (‡aspic).
For generalized rebut in ASPIC⊖ we can proceed analogous to Ex. 2.
7
5.1 Syntactic Relevance
In this section we prove Theorem 1. In the following we suppose that AF⊢ is a setting that satisfies
Pre-Relevance (see Def. 12). We start with some notations:
Definition 20. Where S ⊆ L and a, b ∈ Arg⊢(S), we write a  b iff
̂Supp(a) ⊆ ̂Supp(b).
Definition 21. Where S ⊆ L and E ⊆ Arg⊢(S), let Defended(E ,AF⊢(S)) be the set of all arguments
a ∈ Arg⊢(S) that are defended by arguments in E .
In view of the monotonicity of ·̂ we have:
Fact 3. Where b′  b, if a attacks b′ then a attacks b.
Complete extensions are closed under:
Fact 4. Where S ⊆ L, E ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S)), a ∈ E , and b ∈ Arg⊢(S), then b ∈ E if b  a.
Lemma 2. Where S | S ′, if a ∈ Arg⊢(S ∪ S
′) attacks b ∈ Arg⊢(S), there is an a
′ ∈ Arg⊢(S ∩ Supp(a))
that attacks b.
Proof. Suppose a = (Γ, ψ) ∈ Arg⊢(S ∪S
′) attacks b = (Λ, σ) ∈ Arg⊢(S). Then, ψ ∈ φ for some φ ∈ Λ̂.
Where A1 = Atoms(S), A2 = Atoms(S ′), T1 = Λ, T2 = ∅, S1 = Γ ∩ S and S2 = Γ ∩ S ′, with Def. 11,
S ′1 ⊢ ψ
′ where S ′1 ⊆ S1, ψ
′ ∈ φ′ and φ′ ∈ Λ̂. Thus, (S ′1, ψ
′)  a attacks b.
Lemma 3. Where S | S ′, E ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S)), E
′ ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S
′)), E ∪ E ′ ∈ Adm(AF⊢(S ∪ S
′)).
Proof. Suppose S | S ′, E ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S)) and E
′ ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S
′)). We now show that E ∪ E ′ is
admissible.
Conflict-free: Assume for a contradiction that there are a, a′ ∈ E ∪ E ′ such that a attacks a′. By the
conflict-freeness of E and E ′ it is not the case that a, a′ ∈ E or a, a′ ∈ E ′. Wlog. suppose a ∈ E and
a′ ∈ E ′. By Lemma 2, there is a b ∈ Arg⊢(S
′ ∩ Supp(a)) = Arg⊢(∅) that attacks a
′. Thus, b is trivially
defended by E ′ and by the completeness of E ′, b ∈ E ′. This is a contradiction to the conflict-freeness of E ′.
Admissibility: Suppose some b ∈ Arg⊢(S ∪ S
′) attacks some a ∈ E ∪ E ′. Wlog. assume a ∈ E . By
Lemma 2, there is a b′ ∈ Arg⊢(S ∩ Supp(b)) that attacks a. Thus, there is a c ∈ E that attacks b
′. By Fact
3, c attacks b.
Lemma 4. Where S1 | S2, a, b ∈ Arg⊢(S1 ∪ S2), Supp(b) = Θ and b attacks a,
1. some b′ ∈ Arg⊢(S1 ∩Θ) ∪ Arg⊢(S2 ∩Θ) attacks a;
2. if a ∈ Arg⊢(S1), some b
′ ∈ Arg⊢(S1 ∩Θ) attacks a.
Proof. Let a = (Γ, α) ∈ Arg⊢(S1 ∪ S2). Suppose b = (Θ, β) attacks a. Thus, there is a γ ∈ Γ̂ s.t. β ∈ γ.
By Def. 12 (ii), there are i ∈ {1, 2}, Θ′ ⊆ Θ ∩ Si, φ ∈ Γ̂ ∩ Si and ψ ∈ φ s.t. b′ = (Θ′, ψ) ∈ Arg⊢(Si).
By Def. 12 (iii), Γ̂ ∩ Si ⊆ Γ̂ and hence b′ attacks a.
For Item 2 note that i = 1 when setting T1 = Γ and T2 = ∅ in Def. 11.
Lemma 5. Where S | S ′, E ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)), E1 = E ∩ Arg⊢(S) and E2 = E ∩ Arg⊢(S
′),
1. E = Defended(E1 ∪ E2,AF⊢(S ∪ S
′));
2. E1 ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S)).
Proof. Ad 1. Suppose E defends some a ∈ Arg⊢(S ∪ S
′). By Lemma 4 and Fact 4, E1 ∪ E2 defends a.
Ad 2. Note that E1 is conflict-free since E is conflict-free. Suppose b ∈ Arg⊢(S) attacks some a ∈ E1.
Thus, there is a c ∈ E that attacks b. By Lemma 4 and Fact 4, E1 attacks b. Thus, E1 is admissible. Suppose
E1 defends some d ∈ Arg⊢(S). Then E defends d and hence d ∈ E ∩ Arg⊢(S) = E1. Hence, E1 is
complete.
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Lemma 6. Where S | S ′, E1 ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S)), E2 ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S ′)), E = Defended(E1∪E2,AF⊢(S ∪
S ′)),
1. E ∩ Arg⊢(S) = E1 and E ∩ Arg⊢(S
′) = E2.
2. E ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)).
Proof. Ad 1. Suppose a ∈ Arg⊢(S) ∩ E . Thus, a it is defended by E1 ∪ E2 in AF⊢(S ∪ S
′). Suppose
some b ∈ Arg⊢(S) attacks a. Thus, there is a c = (Λ, σ) ∈ E1 ∪ E2 that attacks b. If c ∈ E2, by Lemma 2,
there is a c′ ∈ Arg⊢(S ∩ Λ) = Arg⊢(∅) that attacks b. Since c
′ has no attackers, by the completeness of
E1, c′ ∈ E1. Altogether this shows that a ∈ Defended(E1,AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)). Again, by the completeness of
E1, a ∈ E1. Thus, E ∩ Arg⊢(S) = E1. Analogously, E ∩ Arg⊢(S
′) = E2. This is Item 1.
Ad 2. Suppose there are a, b ∈ E such that a attacks b. We know that there is a c ∈ E1 ∪ E2 that
attacks a. Wlog. suppose c ∈ E1. Thus, there is a d ∈ E1 ∪ E2 that attacks c. Since by Lemma 3,
E1 ∪ E2 ∈ Adm(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)) we have reached a contradiction. Thus, E is conflict-free.
Suppose now some a ∈ Arg⊢(S ∪S
′) attacks some b ∈ E . By the definition of E there is a c ∈ E1 ∪E2
that attacks b. By item 1, c ∈ E . Thus, E is admissible.
For completeness assume that E defends some a ∈ Arg⊢(S∪S
′). Suppose b = (Λ, β) ∈ Arg⊢(S∪S
′)
attacks a. Hence, there is a c ∈ E that attacks b. In view of Lemma 4 and Fact 3 there is a c′ ∈ (E ∩
Arg⊢(S)) ∪ (E ∩ Arg⊢(S
′)) that attacks b. By Item 1, c′ ∈ E1 ∪ E2 and therefore a ∈ Defended(E1 ∪
E2,AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)) = E .
Lemma 7. Where S | S ′, E1 ∈ Sem(AF⊢(S)), Sem ∈ {Cmp,Prf,Grd}, there is a E ∈ Sem(AF⊢(S ∪
S ′)) for which E1 = E ∩ Arg⊢(S).
Proof. (Sem = Cmp) Let E2 be arbitrary in Cmp(AF⊢(S ′)). By Lemma 6, E = Defended(E1 ∪
E2,AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)) ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)) and E1 = E ∩ Arg⊢(S).
(Sem = Grd) Let E1 = Grd(AF⊢(S)), E2 = Grd(AF⊢(S ′)). Again, by Lemma 6, E = Defended(E1∪
E2,AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)) ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)), E1 = E ∩ Arg⊢(S), and E2 = E ∩ Arg⊢(S
′). Suppose there
is a E⋆ ⊂ E such that E⋆ ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)). By Lemma 5, E⋆ ∩ Arg⊢(S) ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S))
and E⋆ ∩ Arg⊢(S
′) ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S ′)). Thus, E⋆ ∩ Arg⊢(S) = Grd(AF⊢(S)) and E
⋆ ∩ Arg⊢(S
′) =
Grd(AF⊢(S
′)). However, by Lemma 5, E⋆ = Defended(E1 ∪ E2,AF⊢(S ∪ S
′)) = E , a contradiction
with the assumption that E⋆ ⊂ E .
(Sem = Prf) Let E2 ∈ Prf(AF⊢(S ′)) be arbitrary. By Lemma 6, E = Defended(E1 ∪ E2,AF⊢(S ∪
S ′)) ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)). Assume for a contradiction that there is a E ′ ∈ Prf(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)) such
that E ′ ⊃ E . Let E ′1 = E
′ ∩ Arg⊢(S) and E
′
2 = E
′ ∩ Arg⊢(S
′). By Lemma 5, E ′ = Defended(E ′1 ∪
E ′2,AF⊢(S ∪ S
′)). Thus, E1 ⊂ E ′1 or E2 ⊂ E
′
2. However, since by Lemma 5, E
′
1 ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S)) and
E ′2 ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S
′)) this is a contradiction to E1 and E2 being preferred.
Lemma 8. Where S | S ′, E ∈ Prf(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)) and E1 = E ∩ Arg⊢(S), also E1 ∈ Prf(AF⊢(S)).
Proof. Let S | S ′, E ∈ Prf(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)), E1 = E ∩ Arg⊢(S), and E2 = E ∩ Arg⊢(S
′). By Lemma 5,
E1 ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S)) and E2 ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S ′)). Suppose E ′1 ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S)) for which E1 ⊆ E
′
1.
By Lemma 6, where E ′ = Defended(E ′1 ∪ E2,AF⊢(S ∪ S
′)), E ′ ∈ Cmp(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)). By Lemma 5,
E = Defended(E1 ∪ E2,AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)) and thus E ⊆ E ′. Since E is preferred, E = E ′ and hence E1 = E ′1.
Thus, E1 is ⊆-maximal and E1 ∈ Prf(AF⊢(S)).
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose S ∪ {φ} | S ′. We show that S |∼sem φ iff S ∪ S
′ |∼sem φ.
(⇒) Suppose S ∪ S ′ 6|∼sem φ. Thus, there is a E ∈ Sem(AF⊢(S ∪ S
′)) for which there is no a ∈ E
with conclusion φ. By Lemmas 5 and 8, E1 = E ∩ Arg⊢(S) ∈ Sem(AF⊢(S)). Since there is no a ∈ E1
with conclusion φ, S 6|∼sem φ.
(⇐) Suppose S 6|∼sem φ. Thus, there is a E ∈ Sem(AF⊢(S)) for which there is no a ∈ E with
conclusion φ. By Lemma 7, there is a E ′ ∈ Sem(AF⊢(S ∪ S ′)) for which E ′ ∩ Arg⊢(S) = E . Assume
for a contradiction that there is an argument a ∈ E ′ with Conc(a) = φ. By the Pre-Relevance of ⊢, there is
an a′ = (Γ′, φ) ∈ Arg⊢(S ∩ Supp(a)). By Fact 4, a
′ ∈ E which contradicts our main supposition. Thus,
S ∪ S ′ 6|∼sem φ.
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5.2 Semantic Relevance
Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of Theorem 4 below.
Remark 9. The grounded extension can be characterized inductively as follows: Grd(AF⊢(S)) =⋃
α≥0 Grdα(AF⊢(S)) where Grd0(AF⊢(S)) = Defended(∅,AF⊢(S)), for successor ordinals α + 1:
Grdα+1(AF⊢(S)) = Defended(Grdα(AF⊢(S)),AF⊢(S)), and for limit ordinals β: Grdβ(AF⊢(S)) =
Defended(
⋃
α<β Grdα(AF⊢(S)),AF⊢(S)).
Theorem 4. Where AF⊢ = (⊢, ·, ·ˆ), ⊢ satisfies Cut and ·̂ is pointed, if S |∼
AF⊢
grd φ then
1. there is a (Φ, φ) ∈ Grd(AF⊢(S)),
2. Grd(AF⊢(S)) ⊆ Grd(AF⊢+φ(S)),
3. Grd(AF⊢+φ(S)) ∩Arg⊢(S) = Grd(AF⊢(S)),
4. for every a = (Γ, γ) ∈ Grd(AF⊢+φ(S)) \Arg⊢(S), (Γ ∪ Φ, γ) ∈ Grd(AF⊢(S)) .
Proof. Ad 1. This is due to the fact that S |∼AF⊢grd φ.
Ad 2. We give an inductive proof. (Base) Let a ∈ Grd0(AF⊢(S)). Suppose some b = (Γ, γ) ∈
Arg⊢+φ(S) attacks a. Thus, b /∈ Arg⊢(S). Thus, b
′ = (Γ∪Φ, γ) ∈ Arg⊢(S) by Cut. This is a contradiction
since b′ attacks a. So a has no attackers in Arg⊢+φ and so a ∈ Grd(AF⊢+φ(S)).
(Step) We consider a successor ordinal α + 1. Let a ∈ Grdα+1(AF⊢(S)). Suppose b = (Γ, γ) ∈
Arg⊢+φ(S) attacks a. If b ∈ Arg⊢(S) there is a c ∈ Grdα(AF⊢(S)) that attacks b. By the inductive
hypothesis (IH), c ∈ Grd(AF⊢+φ(S)). Otherwise, by Cut b
′ = (Γ ∪ Φ, γ) ∈ Arg⊢(S) and b
′ attacks a.
Thus, there is a d ∈ Grdα(AF⊢(S)) that attacks b′ in some β ∈ Γ̂ ∪ Φ. Since ·̂ is pointed, β ∈ Γ̂ ∪ Φ̂.
Since (Φ, φ) ∈ Grd(AF⊢(S)), β ∈ Γ̂ and hence d attacks b in AF⊢+φ(S). By IH, d ∈ Grd(AF⊢+φ(S)).
Altogether this shows that a is defended by Grd(AF⊢+φ(S)) and thus a ∈ Grd(AF⊢+φ(S)).
The case for limit ordinals α′ is analogous.
Ad 3 and 4. We show both simultaneously via induction. (Base) Let a = (Γ, γ) ∈ Grd0(AF⊢+φ(S)).
Suppose first that a ∈ Arg⊢(S). Since Arg⊢(S) ⊆ Arg⊢+φ(S), there are no attackers of a in Arg⊢(S)
and hence a ∈ Grd0(AF⊢(S)). Suppose now that a /∈ Arg⊢(S). By Cut, a
′ = (Γ ∪ Φ, γ) ∈ Arg⊢(S).
Suppose some b ∈ Arg⊢(S) attacks a
′ in some β ∈ Γ̂ ∪ Φ. By the pointedness of ·̂, β ∈ Γ̂ ∪ Φ̂. Note that
β /∈ Γ̂ since otherwise b attacks a but a has no attackers. Thus, β ∈ Φ̂. Hence, b attacks (Φ, φ) and is thus
attacked by Grd(AF⊢(S)). Thus, a′ is defended by Grd(AF⊢(S)) and so a′ ∈ Grd(AF⊢(S)).
(Step) We consider a successor ordinal α + 1. Let a = (Γ, γ) ∈ Grdα+1(AF⊢+φ(S)). Suppose first
that a ∈ Arg⊢(S). Suppose some b ∈ Arg⊢(S) attacks a. Thus, there is a c = (Λ, σ) ∈ Grdα(AF⊢+φ(S))
that attacks b. By the inductive hypothesis, if c ∈ Arg⊢(S), c ∈ Grd(AF⊢(S)) and otherwise (Λ∪Φ, σ) ∈
Grd(AF⊢(S)). In either case Grd(AF⊢(S)) defends a from the attacker and thus a ∈ Grd(AF⊢(S)).
Suppose now that a /∈ Arg⊢(S). By Cut, a
′ = (Γ∪Φ, γ) ∈ Arg⊢(S). Suppose some b ∈ Arg⊢(S) attacks
a′ in some β ∈ Γ̂ ∪ Φ. By the pointedness of ·̂, β ∈ Γ̂ ∪ Φ̂. If β ∈ Φ̂, b attacks (Φ, φ) and is thus attacked
by Grd(AF⊢(S)). If β ∈ Γ̂, b attacks a. Thus, there is a c = (Λ, σ) ∈ Grdα(AF⊢+φ(S)) that attacks b. By
the inductive hypothesis, if c ∈ Arg⊢(S), c ∈ Grd(AF⊢(S)) and otherwise (Λ ∪ Φ, σ) ∈ Grd(AF⊢(S)).
In either case Grd(AF⊢(S)) defends a from the attacker and thus a ∈ Grd(AF⊢(S)).
The case for limit ordinals α′ is analogous.
Our previous result does not generalize to preferred semantics or to ⊢ that do not satisfy Cut. We give
two examples.
Example 13 ([17]). Consider an ASPIC framework with defeasible rulesD = {n0 : ⊤ ⇒ p; n1 : p∨ q ⇒
¬p}, facts P = ∅, the strict rules induced by classical logic (see Ex. 12), and φ = ψ if φ = ¬ψ and
φ = ¬φ else. Consider the ASPIC-arguments a0 = ⊤ ⇒ p; a = a0 → (p ∨ q) and b = a ⇒ ¬p.
With (‡aspic) we have the arguments a0 = ({n0,⊤ ⇒ p, p}, p), a = ({n0,⊤ ⇒ p, p}, p ∨ q) and b =
({n0, n1,⊤ ⇒ p, p, p ∨ q ⇒ ¬p,¬p},¬p) in AF⊢(S) where S = {n0,⊤ ⇒ p, n1, p ∨ q ⇒ ¬p, p,¬p}.
Note that b attacks a0, a and b while a0 attacks b. Thus, the only preferred extension contains both a0
and a which means that S |∼Prf p and S |∼Prf p ∨ q. Once we move to ⊢
+(p∨q) we also have the argument
c = ({n1, p ∨ q ⇒ ¬p,¬p},¬p) attacking a0. It is easy to see that now S 6|∼
+(p∨q)
Prf p.
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Example 14. We now consider the same example but with ⊢⋆ = {(Γ, φ) ∈ ⊢ | Γ is CL-consistent} and
grounded extension. Unlike Ex. 13, b is not anymore in AF⊢⋆(S). Thus, S |∼
AF⊢⋆
Grd p and S |∼
AF⊢⋆
Grd p ∨ q.
Once we move to ⊢
+(p∨q)
⋆ , c = ({n1, p∨q ⇒ ¬p,¬p},¬p) again attacks a0 and a and thus, S 6|∼
AF
+(p∨q)
⊢⋆
Grd p.
Note that ⊢⋆ does not satisfy Cut.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem. 3.
Definition 22. LetAF⊢ = 〈⊢, ·, id〉. A setΘ ⊆ S ismaximalAF⊢(S)-consistent iff there is noAF⊢(S)-
consistent Θ′ ⊆ S such Θ ⊂ Θ′. We write CS(AF⊢(S)) [MCS(AF⊢(S))] for all [maximal] AF⊢(S)-
consistent sets.
Lemma 9. Where S ⊆ L, AF⊢ = (⊢, ·, id) is contrapositable, ⊢ satisfies Cut, and Θ ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)),
Arg⊢(Θ) ∈ Stb(AF con(S)).
Proof. Suppose Θ ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)). To show that E = Arg⊢(Θ) is conflict-free assume there are
a, b ∈ E such that a = (Γ, γ) attacks b = (Λ, σ) where γ ∈ λ and λ ∈ Λ. Then Γ ∪ {λ} ⊆ Θ. If λ ∈ Γ
then by contraposition, Γ \ {λ} ⊢ γ′ for some γ′ ∈ λ and hence Θ /∈ CS(AF⊢(S)). If λ /∈ Γ, also
Θ /∈ CS(AF⊢(S)). We have reached a contradiction.
Consider some b = (Λ, σ) ∈ Argcon(S) \ E . Then Θ ∪ {β} is AF⊢(S)-inconsistent for some β ∈ Λ.
Thus, there is a Θ′ ⊆ Θ for which (Θ′ ∪ {β}) \ {σ} ⊢ σ′ where σ′ ∈ σ for some σ ∈ Θ ∪ {β}. If
σ = β, Θ′ \ {σ} ⊢ σ′ where σ′ ∈ β. In this case let a′ = (Θ′ \ {σ}, σ′) ∈ E . If σ 6= β, by contraposition
Θ′ ∪ {σ} ⊢ β′ for some β′ ∈ β. In this case let a′ = (Θ′ ∪ {σ}, β′) ∈ E . Since in any case a′ attacks b, E
is stable.
Lemma 10. Where AF⊢ = (⊢, ·, id) is contrapositable, ⊢ satisfies Cut, and E ∈ Prf(AF con(S)),⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E} ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)).
Proof. Let E ∈ Prf(AF con(S)). Suppose Λ =
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E} /∈ CS(AF⊢(S)). Thus, there is a
⊆-minimal Θ ⊆ Λ such that Θ \ {γ} ⊢ ψ where ψ ∈ γ and γ ∈ Θ. Thus, Θ \ {γ} ∈ CS(AF⊢(S)) and
hence b = (Θ \ {γ}, ψ) ∈ Argcon(S). Also, since Θ ⊆ Λ, there is a c ∈ E for which γ ∈ Supp(c). Then,
b attacks c. Hence, there is a d = (∆, δ′) ∈ E that attacks b such that δ′ ∈ δ for some δ ∈ Θ \ {γ}. Since
Θ ⊆ Λ, there is an e ∈ E with δ ∈ Supp(e). Thus, d attacks e which contradicts the conflict-freeness of E .
Thus, Λ ∈ CS(AF⊢(S)).
Since Λ ∈ CS(AF⊢(S)), there is a Θ ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)) for which Λ ⊆ Θ. By Lemma 9, Arg⊢(Θ) ∈
Stb(AF con(S)) and henceArg⊢(Θ) = E by the⊆-maximality of E . Thus,Λ = Θ ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)).
Corollary 2. Where S ⊆ L, AF⊢ = (⊢, ·, id) is contrapositable and ⊢ satisfies Cut, Stb(AF con(S)) =
Prf(AF con(S)).
Proof. Suppose E ∈ Prf(AF con(S)). By Lemma 10, Θ =
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E} ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)).
By Lemma 9, Arg⊢(Θ) ∈ Stb(AF con(S)). By the ⊆-maximality of E , E = Arg⊢(Θ) and hence E ∈
Stb(AF con(S)). It is well-known that every stable extension is preferred.
Lemma 11. Where S ⊆ L, AF⊢ = (⊢, ·, id) is contrapositable, ⊢ satisfies Cut, and for every Θ ∈
MCS(AF⊢(S)) there is a Θ′ ⊆ Θ for which Θ′ ⊢ φ, we have: MCS(AF⊢(S)) = MCS(AF
+φ
⊢ (S)).
Proof. It suffices to showMCS(AF⊢(S)) ⊆ CS(AF
+φ
⊢ (S)) andMCS(AF
+φ
⊢ (S)) ⊆ CS(AF⊢(S)).
Let Θ ∈ MCS(AF+φ⊢ (S)). Assume Θ /∈ CS(AF⊢(S)). Thus, there is a Θ
′ ⊆ Θ and a γ ∈ Θ′ for
which Θ′ \ {γ} ⊢ ψ where ψ ∈ γ. But then Θ′ \ {γ} ⊢+φ ψ and hence Θ /∈ CS(AF+φ⊢ (S)) which is a
contradiction. HenceΘ ∈ CS(AF⊢(S)).
LetΘ ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)). AssumeΘ /∈ CS(AF
+φ
⊢ (S)). Then there is aΘ
′ ⊆ Θ such thatΘ′\{γ} ⊢+φ
ψ where ψ ∈ γ and γ ∈ Θ′. Since Θ ∈ CS(AF⊢(S)), Θ′ \ {γ} 0 ψ. Since Θ′′ ⊢ φ for some Θ′′ ⊆ Θ,
by Cut, Θ′′ ∪ (Θ′ \ {γ}) ⊢ ψ and by contraposition (Θ′′ ∪ Θ′) \ {γ} ⊢ ψ′ for some ψ′ ∈ γ. Thus,
Θ /∈ CS(AF⊢(S)) which is a contradiction. Hence Θ ∈ CS(AF
+φ
⊢ (S)).
Lemma 12. Where S ⊆ L, AF⊢ is contrapositable and ⊢ satisfies Cut, we have that Grd(AF con(S)) =
Arg⊢ (
⋂
MCS(AF⊢(S))).
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Proof. Suppose a ∈ Grd(AF con(S)). Then a ∈
⋂
Prf(AF con(S)). By Lemmas 9, 10, and Corollary 2,
a ∈
⋂
Θ∈MCS(AF⊢(S))
Arg⊢(Θ) and hence a ∈ Arg⊢ (
⋂
MCS(AF⊢(S))).
Suppose Θ ⊆
⋂
MCS(AF⊢(S)) and Γ ⊢ γ. Consider a = (Γ, γ) ∈ Arg⊢(Θ). Suppose some
b = (Λ, σ) ∈ Argcon(S) attacks a. Thus, σ ∈ α for some α ∈ Γ. But then Λ∪ {α} /∈ CS(AF⊢(S)) while
Λ ∈ CS(AF⊢(S)). Thus, there is a Λ′ ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)) for which Λ ⊆ Λ′ and α /∈ Λ′ which contradicts
that α ∈
⋂
MCS(AF⊢(S)). So, a ∈ Grd(AF con(S)) since it has no attackers.
Corollary 3. Where AF⊢ is contrapositable and ⊢ satisfies Cut, if there is a Θ ⊆
⋂
MCS(AF⊢(S)) for
which Θ ⊢ φ then
⋂
MCS(AF⊢(S)) =
⋂
MCS(AF+φ⊢ (S)) for every S ⊆ L.
Proof. This follows directly with Lemma 11.
Fact 5. If ⊢ satisfies Cut, ⊢+φ satisfies Cut. If AF⊢ is contrapositable,AF⊢+φ is contrapositable.
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊢+φ ψ and Γ′, ψ ⊢+φ ψ′. Then Γ ⊢ ψ or Γ, φ ⊢ ψ and Γ′, ψ ⊢ ψ′ or Γ′, ψ, φ ⊢ ψ′.
Since ⊢ satisfies Cut we get Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ψ′ or Γ,Γ′, φ ⊢ ψ′. Hence, Γ,Γ′ ⊢+φ ψ′.
Suppose Θ ⊢+φ γ′ for some γ′ ∈ γ and let σ ∈ Θ. Then either Θ ⊢ γ′ or Θ, φ ⊢ γ′. Since AF⊢
is contrapositable, for some σ′ ∈ σ, either (Θ ∪ {γ}) \ {σ} ⊢ σ′ or (Θ ∪ {γ}) \ {σ}, φ ⊢ σ′. Thus,
(Θ ∪ {γ}) \ {σ} ⊢+φ σ′.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let Sem ∈ {Prf, Stb} and S ⊆ L. Suppose S |∼AF conSem φ. Let Θ ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)).
By Lemma 9 and Corollary 2, Arg⊢(Θ) ∈ Sem(AF con(S)). Since S |∼
AFcon
Sem φ, there is a (Γ, φ) ∈
Arg⊢(Θ). Hence Γ ⊢ φ and Γ ⊆ Θ. Hence, by Lemma 11, (⋆)MCS(AF⊢(S)) = MCS(AF
+φ
⊢ (S)).
We now first show extensional cumulativity.
Suppose first that E ∈ Sem(AF con(S)). Thus, by Lemma 10 and Corollary 2,
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈
E} ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)). By Lemma 9 and Corollary 2, Arg⊢(
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E}) ∈ Sem(AF con(S)).
Since Arg⊢(
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E}) ⊇ E and E ∈ Sem(AF con(S)), by the ⊆-maximality of E , E =
Arg⊢(
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E}). Also, by (⋆),
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E} ∈ MCS(AF+φ⊢ (S)). Let E
+ =
Arg
+φ
⊢ (
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E}). By Fact 5, Lemma 9 and Corollary 2, E+ ∈ Sem(AF+φ⊢ (S)). Note that
E+ ∩ Arg⊢(S) = E .
Suppose now that E+ ∈ Sem(AF+φ⊢ (S)). By Lemma 10 and Corollary 2,
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E+} ∈
MCS(AF+φ⊢ (S)). By (⋆),
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E+} ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)). By Lemma 9 and Corollary 2, where
E = Arg⊢(
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E+}), E ∈ Sem(AF⊢(S)). Note that E = E+ ∩ Arg⊢(S).
Altogether we have shown extensional cumulativity.
For cumulativity suppose S 6 |∼AF conSem ψ. Thus, there is an E ∈ Sem(AF con(S)) such that there is no
(Ψ, ψ) ∈ E . By Lemma 10 and Corollary 2,
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E} ∈ MCS(AF⊢(S)). By Lemma 9 and
Corollary 2, Arg⊢(
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E}) ∈ Sem(AF con(S)) and thus, by the ⊆-maximality of E , E =
Arg⊢(
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E}). Also, since S |∼AFconSem φ there is a (Θ, φ) ∈ E . By extensional cumulativity,
there is a E+ ∈ Sem(AF+φcon(S)) such that E = E
+ ∩ Argcon(S). Assume there is a (Λ, ψ) ∈ E
+ \ E .
Thus, Λ 0 ψ but Λ, φ ⊢ ψ. Since Θ ⊢ φ, by Cut, Λ ∪ Θ ⊢ ψ. Since Λ ∪ Θ ⊆
⋃
{Supp(a) | a ∈ E},
(Λ∪Θ, ψ) ∈ E , which is a contradiction. Since there is no argumentwith conclusionψ in E+, S 6 |∼
AF+φcon
Sem ψ.
Suppose now for the other direction that S 6 |∼
AF+φcon
Sem ψ. Thus, there is a E
+ ∈ Sem(AF+φcon(S)) such
that there is no (Ψ, ψ) ∈ E+. Since, by extensional cumulativity, E = E+∩Argcon(S) ∈ Sem(AF con(S)),
also S 6 |∼AF conSem ψ.
Let Sem = Grd and suppose S |∼AFconGrd φ. By Fact 5, Lemma 12 and Corollary 3, Grd (AF con(S)) =
Arg⊢ (
⋂
MCS(AF⊢(S))) = Arg⊢
(⋂
MCS(AF+φ⊢ (S))
)
= Grd(AF+φcon(S)). Cumulativity then follows
by an analogous argument as in the case of Sem ∈ {Prf, Stb}.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the robustness of systems of structured argumentation under the addition of
irrelevant information. To this end we introduced a simple and easily accessible account of structured argu-
mentation in which meta-theoretic properties can be studied conveniently while systems from the literature
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can be represented. We studied the properties Non-Interference, Crash Resistance, and Cumulativity. In fu-
ture work we plan to incorporate priorities (e.g., [1, 11, 18]) and to extend our study to other meta-theoretic
properties, such as other properties of non-monotonic inference ([16]) and rationality postulates ([8]).
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